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DID PAUL CAUSE AN INTERPOLATION IN THE SECOND CODE? 




We know of Justinian that he ordered the committees who drew up the various law codes to 
change the texts if necessary. These so-called interpolations have been, and still are hotly 
debated, because no one knows the exact amount of changes carried through. Nowadays 
scholars tend to think there were a lot less changes made, contrary to what their twentieth-
century predecessors thought. Whereas these predecessors very often based their suspicions 
of interpolations on purely linguistic grounds, nowadays we tend to require some kind of 
external evidence as basis for a suspicion of interpolation.1 
What is interesting about all this is, to my mind, not the bare question whether texts 
have been altered, but how the committees went about this business. Would it not be nice 
to have a glimpse through the kitchen window, a look into the boiler-room of Justinian's 
codification project? Is this still possible after all this time? Perhaps not. But would it not 
be lovely to have a little peek around the corner? I will try to take you on a little trip in an 
attempt to have this furtive glance. No doubt I will fail in offering you this miniature picture 
of legislative activity. But it will perhaps be worth the effort. Our road will lead us to a 
couple of Basilica scholia on changes in the law of dowry. 
The Basilica scholia offer one of the most explicit references to an interpolation in 
Justinian’s codes. What is special about this particular reference is that is contemporaneous 
with the codification project. The reference occurs in the old sixth-century scholia on the 




                                                          
 
1  J.H.A. Lokin, ‘The End of an Epoch. Epilegomena to a Century of Interpolation Criticism’, in R. Feenstra 
/ A.S. Hartkamp / J.E. Spruit / P.J. Sijpesteijn / L.C. Winkel (eds.), Collatio iuris romani. Études dédiées 
à Hans Ankum à l’occasion de son 65e anniversaire, Tome I, (Studia Amstelodamensia ad epigraphicam, 
ius antiquum et papyrologicam pertinentia, Vol. XXXV, A), Amsterdam 1995, pp. 261-273 (repr. in: 
J.H.A. Lokin, Analecta Groningana ad ius graeco-romanum pertinentia, (ed. Th.E. van Bochove), 






BS 2135/1-2 (sch. F 2 ad B. 29,5,37 = C. 5,14,7) 
Τοῦτο τὸ ῥητὸν σήμερον κατὰ καινοτομίαν προσετέθη· καὶ ἔστι παρὰ τὴν καθόλου διαίρεσιν 
καὶ χρὴ αὐτὸ ὡς ἰδικὸν καὶ ξένον σημειώσθαι. 
‘This part of the Latin text has now been added in accordance with a change in the law; and 
it is against the general determination and needs to be noted as special and new’. 
 
First, let us look at the Basilica and their scholia, to explain their significance in order to 
find out what went on in Justinian’s boiler-room.2 The Basilica are in essence a collection 
of Greek versions of Justinian’s law codes. The term means ‘Imperial’, and is an abbrevia-
tion of the phrase τὰ βασιλικὰ νόμιμα, the imperial laws. This collection was completed 
during the reign of the emperor Leo VI, also known as Leo the Wise, who ruled from the 
year 886 AD until the year 912 AD. So there is nothing contemporaneous with the Justinia-
nic age in the making of this collection. The texts used, however, were sixth-century ver-
sions. The text of the Basilica consisted of 60 books. These books were subdivided into 
titles. Ideally, every title contained Greek versions of provisions from the Digest, the Code 
and the Novels, all pertaining to the same subject matter. A little later, during the tenth 
century, the so-called old scholia were added to the Basilica text. These scholia presented 
more Greek versions of the same texts. The reason why more versions of the same texts 
were added is that the original Latin texts of Justinian’s codes were still the texts in force, 
which had to be applied. Comparison of more versions could lead to a better understanding 
of the law to be applied. Especially where, as in the case of the Digest, the version used in 
the text of the Basilica was a summary version.3 There are also so-called new scholia to the 
Basilica. These new scholia were written and added to the Basilica text throughout the 
eleventh century, and later. They are of much later date than Justinian’s own age. So if we 
are in search of material from the scholia contemporaneous with Justinian, we first have to 
locate the old scholia. Then we have to try and find out which author wrote the scholion. 
That is because not all sixth-century material stems from the days of Justinian’s codifying 
 
 
                                                          
 
2  See for the following e.g. N. van der Wal / J.H.A. Lokin, Historiae iuris graeco-romani delineatio. Les 
sources du droit byzantin de 300 à 1453, Groningen 1985, pp. 81ff., 90ff., 99ff. Cf. also Th.E. van 
Bochove, Basilica Online Bibliography (https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/browse/basilica-online, 
Tab Bibliography), Nos. 107-112 (general), 158-162 (Basilica text), and 242-246 (Basilica scholia). 
3  Cf. for a second reason for the addition of the old scholia to the Basilica in the tenth century, i.e. the 
phenomenon of ‘Byzantine Encyclopaedism’, or rather the ‘cultura della συλλογή’, or ‘culture du re-
cueil’ during the reign of emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos, Th.E. van Bochove, ‘Tenth Cen-
tury Constantinople: Centre of Legal Learning? Second thoughts concerning the addition of the older 
scholia to the Basilica text’, FM XII (2014), pp. 69-96, esp. p. 79ff. 
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project. Some of it is from a little later date. So, after isolating texts stemming from authors 
writing in the days of Justinian and his law codes, we have sources at hand, which may 
provide a clue to the way in which this project was carried out.4 
Now let us return to the scholion we just read, about the change in the law of dowry. 
It is probably Thalelaeus who is telling us about this interpolation. Thalelaeus was an ante-
cessor (professor of law) in the days of Justinian of whom we have testimony regarding his 
lectures on the Code of Justinian, found in the text and scholia on the Basilica.5 The text he 
is commenting upon here is taken from Justinian’s Code. That this scholion is taken from a 
sixth-century commentator is proved by the use of the word ῥητὸν, which in this case refers 
to the Latin text of the Code itself.6 That it is Thalelaeus who is the author of the scholion 
follows, amongst other things, from a comparison with similar utterances ascribed to him 
and collected by Dieter Simon.7 
The text of the Code commented upon is C. 5,14,7: 
 
Idem AA (Imperatores Diocletianus et Maximianus) et CC. Phileto. Pater, pro filia dotem 
datam genero ea prius in matrimonio defuncta nepotibus pactus restitui, licet his actionem 
quaerere non potuit, tamen utilis eis ex aequitate accommodabitur actio. D. XIIII K. Ian. 
Nicomediae CC. conss. <A. 294> 
‘The same Augusti (Diocletian and Maximian) and Caesars to Philetus. A father gave a dowry 
to his son-in-law on behalf of his daughter and made an agreement that, if the marriage were 
ended by her death, the dowry would be given back to his grandchildren. Although he could 
not acquire a right of action for them, an analogous action will nevertheless be framed for 
 
 
                                                          
 
4  Cf. about the way to distinguish old from new scholia in general Van Bochove, Basilica Online Biblio-
graphy (supra n. 2), Nos. 10-16, and 247-251. 
5  Cf. e.g. Van der Wal / Lokin, Delineatio (supra n. 2), p. 42f. See especially S. Sciortino, ‘Conjectures 
regarding Thalelaios’ commentary on the Novus Codex’, SG IX (2014), pp. 157-185. Cf. also Van 
Bochove, Basilica Online Bibliography (supra n. 2), Nos. 471-487. 
6  Cf. H.J. Scheltema, L’enseignement de droit des antécesseurs, (Byzantina neerlandica. Series B: Stu-
dia, I), Leiden 1970, pp. 10, 14, 32ff. (repr. in H.J. Scheltema, Opera minora ad iuris historiam perti-
nentia, (collegerunt N. van der Wal, J.H.A. Lokin, B.H. Stolte, Roos Meijering), Groningen 2004, pp. 
58-110 (66, 69, 81ff.)). 
7  D. Simon, ‘Aus dem Kodexunterricht des Thalelaios’. A: Methode, SZ 86 (1969), pp. 334-383; B: Die 
Heroen, SZ 87 (1970), pp. 315-394; C: Interpolationsberichte, RIDA, 3e série, 16 (1969), pp. 283-308; 







them from reasons of equity (aequitas). Given December 19, at Nicomedia, in the consulship 
of the Caesars’ (294).8 
 
The father of a bride gave his son-in-law a dowry. In doing so he agreed with his son in law 
that if his daughter should die first during the marriage, the dowry should be given to his 
grandchildren, the sons born from the marriage. The question the emperors had to answer 
was whether the sons could sue their father on the basis of this agreement. The answer was 
that the grandfather could not grant his grandchildren a right of action in this way. They 
were, however, given an actio utilis by reason of equity. 
The part of the text Thalelaeus is referring to is the final sentence of the constitution 
giving the actio utilis to the grandchildren. This part is remarkable, because the grandfather 
who gave his daughter a dowry and stipulated it should be returned to his grandchildren 
should the daughter die during marriage, could not provide them with a right of action, as 
the ban on stipulations on behalf of third parties prevented this generally speaking.9 This 
will be the general provision Thalelaeus is referring to in the scholion, by means of the 
phrase (παρὰ) τὴν καθόλου διαίρεσιν. He clearly indicates the actio utilis is new in the text. 
It is there now, σήμερον. That means it was not there when Diocletian and Maximian issued 
their constitution. It was added, προσετέθη. Moreover, the addition was made because of a 
change in the law, καινοτομίαν, a legal innovation. Καινοτομία in this sense is found in 
several other Basilica scholia as well.10 Simon concluded he could not make out whether 
this interpolation occurred only in the second Code, as most other changes he discussed, or 
that it was already made in the first Code.11 
 
 
                                                          
 
8  Transl. T.A.J. McGinn, in B.W. Frier (ed.), The Codex of Justinian. A New Annotated Translation, with 
Parallel Latin and Greek Text. Based on a Translation by Justice Fred H. Blume, Cambridge 2016, (3 
vols.), Vol. II, p. 1203. 
9  Cf. e.g. G. Wesenberg, Verträge zugunsten Dritter. Rechtsgeschichtliches und Rechtsvergleichendes, 
(Forschungen zum römischen Recht, I. Band, 2. Abhandlung), Weimar 1949, pp. 48ff.; see also, more 
recently, Th. Finkenauer, Vererblichkeit und Drittwirkungen der Stipulation im klassischen römischen 
Recht, (Tübinger Rechtswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen, 108), Tübingen 2010, pp. 15ff. (esp. n. 15), 
who, however, speaks of ‘gewichtige Ausnahmen die Juristen in der Spätklassik von diesem Grundsatz 
machen’; J.D. Harke, Actio utilis. Anspruchsanalogie im römischen Recht, (Schriften zur Rechtsge-
schichte, Band 175), Berlin 2016, pp. 291ff. 
10  Cf. BS 433/10 (sch. Ca 1 ad B. 11,2,60 = C. 2,4,43; Theodorus); BS 1265/5 (sch. Pa 2 ad B. 21,1,43 = 
C. 4,20,19; Theodorus); BS 2010/11 (sch. F, Pa 2 ad B. 29,1,24 = D. 23,3,28; Enantiophanes); BS 
2297/32, 2298/34 and 2299/29 (sch. Pb 1 ad B. 39,1,6 = D. 5,2,6; Stephanus); BS 2341/4 and 5 (sch. 
Pb 3 ad B. 39,1,52 = C. 3,28,27; Thalelaeus); BS 2469/12 (sch. Pb 4 ad B. 41,4,5 = C. 3,29,5; 
Thalelaeus); BS 2491/27 (sch. Pb 1 ad B. 41,7,36 (35) = C. 6,20,20; Theodorus); BS 2496/21 (sch. Pb 
3 ad B. 42,1,3 = D. 5,3,3; Stephanus). 
11  Cf. Simon, ‘Kodexunterricht des Thalelaios. C: Interpolationsberichte’ (supra n. 7), p. 302f. 
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Therefore, what we have here is a clear indication of a legal innovation, which led to an 
interpolation. That was already noticed long ago.12 The question is, however, whether this 
innovation was made solely by this interpolation, or whether this interpolation was a result 
of something else. Before I embark upon an attempt to answer this question, I want to take 
you to a related case, to be found in the Digest: 
 
D. 24,3,45 
Paulus libro sexto quaestionum. Gaius Seius avus maternus Seiae nepti, quae erat in patris 
potestate, certam pecuniae quantitatem dotis nomine Lucio Titio marito dedit et instrumento 
dotali huiusmodi pactum et stipulationem complexus est: “Si inter Lucium Titium maritum et 
Seiam divortium sine culpa mulieris factum esset, dos omnis Seiae uxori vel Gaio Seio avo 
materno redderetur restituereturque”. Quaero, cum Seius avus maternus statim vita defunctus 
sit et Seia postea sine culpa sua divorterit vivo patre suo, in cuius potestate est, an et cui actio 
ex hoc pacto et stipulatione competat et utrum heredi avi materni ex stipulatu an nepti. 
Respondi in persona quidem neptis videri inutiliter stipulationem esse conceptam, quoniam 
avus maternus ei stipulatus proponitur: quod cum ita est, heredi stipulatoris, quandoque 
divorterit mulier, actio competere videtur. Sed dicendum est Seiae posse dotem solvi 
(quamvis actio ei directo non competat), ac si sibi aut illi dari avus stipulatus esset. Sed 
permittendum est nepti ex hac avita conventione, ne commodo dotis defrudetur, utilem 
actionem: favore enim nuptiarum et maxime propter affectionem personarum ad hoc 
decurrendum est. 
‘Paul, Questions, Book VI. Gaius Seius, the maternal grandfather of Seia, who was under 
paternal control, gave a certain sum of money by way of dowry to Lucius Titius, her husband, 
and inserted in the dotal instrument the following agreement and stipulation: “If a divorce 
should take place between Lucius Titius, the husband, and Seia, without her fault, all the 
dowry shall be returned to Seia, his wife, or to Gaius Seius, her maternal grandfather”. I ask, 
if Seius, the maternal grandfather, should die immediately after making this agreement, and 
Seia should subsequently, without being to blame, be divorced during the lifetime of her 
father, under whose control she was, in favour of whom an action would lie under the 
agreement and the stipulation, of the heir of the maternal grandfather, or of his granddaughter. 
I answered that the stipulation would seem to be void, as far as the granddaughter personally 
was concerned, as the maternal grandfather made the stipulation in her favour; for, since this 
 
 
                                                          
 
12  For instance, Antoine Favre wrote about it; cf. his Conjecturarum iuris civilis libri viginti, Lyon 1581 






is true, a right of action would be held to lie in favour of the heir of the stipulator, whenever 
the woman was divorced. It must be said, however, that the dowry can be paid to Seia, even 
though no action will lie directly in her favour; just as if her grandfather had stipulated that it 
should be given to him, or to someone else.13 The granddaughter ought, however, on account 
of the agreement of her grandfather, to be permitted to bring an actio utilis to prevent her from 
being defrauded of the benefit of the dowry; recourse to this should be had because of the 
favour conceded to marriage, and especially on account of the affection existing between the 
parties’.14 
 
This is a very long and somewhat complicated text. The case is not quite the same as the 
one from the Code. Here it is not the father, but the grandfather, Gaius Seius, who provides 
the husband of his granddaughter, called Seia, with a sum of money as a dowry.15 The grand-
father is the father of Seia’s mother. This explains why she is not under his control, but 
under the control of her father. Watson’s translation reads ‘a granddaughter in his [i.e. the 
grandfather’s] power’, but I think that is mistaken, and so do the German and the Dutch 
translations.16 The husband is called Lucius Titius, in the fragment at least, if not in real life. 
A dotal instrument is drawn up in which the return of the dowry is agreed and stipulated in 
case of divorce without fault on the part of Seia. The dowry should then be handed over to 
Seia or handed back to Gaius Seius, the grandfather. The grandfather dies and Seia is 
divorced without her fault. The question Paul asked himself was who then would have the 
right of action. Would that be the heir of the grandfather, whoever that may be, or would it 
be Seia? Paul answers in a very extensive way. He explains there is no direct action on 
behalf of Seia. The grandfather could not stipulate on behalf of his granddaughter.17 He then 
explains the dowry could have been paid validly to Seia, just as if the grandfather had 
stipulated the sum to be paid to himself or someone else. He must have thought here of the 
 
 
                                                          
 
13  Cf. D. 46,3,10 and D. 46,3,12,3. 
14  Translation based on S.P. Scott, The Civil law, Including The Twelve Tables, The Institutes of Gaius, The 
Rules of Ulpian, The Opinions of Paulus, The Enactments of Justinian, and The Constitutions of Leo: 
Translated from the original Latin, Cincinnati 1932, vol. 6, p. 19f., with slight alterations. See for the 
reason why I preferred this translation to Watson’s in this instance below in the text near footnote 16. 
15  The names suggest it is a textbook case. 
16  The Digest of Justinian. English translation edited by A. Watson, Philadelphia 1985, vol. 2, p. 726a; 
O. Behrends, R. Knütel et alii (Hrsg.), Corpus Iuris Civilis. Text und Übersetzung, IV: Digesten 21-
27, Heidelberg 2005, p. 296 (‘die in der Hausgewalt ihres Vaters stand’); J.E. Spruit et alii (red.), 
Corpus Iuris Civilis. Tekst en Vertaling, III: Digesten 11-24, Zutphen/’s-Gravenhage 1996, p. 913 (‘die 
onder het gezag van haar vader stond’). 
17  If she had been under his control, there would be no problem. This is what the Watson-translation 
appears to overlook. 
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case of an solutionis causa adiectus.18 Such a person to whom a debt due to another could 
be paid was not a creditor himself, but payment to the adiectus freed the debtor from his 
obligation. The adiectus was entitled to receive payment, not to exact it. Then all of a sudden 
Paul suggests the granddaughter should be given an actio utilis. He goes on to explain this. 
The granddaughter should be prevented from being defrauded of the benefit of her dowry. 
She should not be the victim of the legally clumsy way in which the grandfather went about 
his business, we could perhaps read Paul to mean. The favour to the marriage and the 
affection of the parties, meaning the grandfather and his granddaughter, should be counted 
as arguments to follow this course. 
Of course, the rather sudden change of direction in the answer Paul gives has been 
taken to indicate the granting of the actio utilis here to be interpolated.19 Other voices say 
the extensive answer rather points in the direction of an authentic reply given by Paul to the 
question he asked himself.20 Be that as it may, I want to point out another possibility, an 
intriguing one, I might add. 
I want to confront you with a remarkable utterance by Dorotheus, who translated this 
Digest text. Dorotheus, too, was a law professor from the days of Justinian. In fact, he was 
not only a law professor - in Beirut that is - but also a member of the committees that drew 
up the Digest, the Institutes and the Second Code. If there was anyone who knew about the 
business of making Justinian's law codes, apart from Tribonian and - perhaps - Justinian 
himself, it was Dorotheus. After being a codificator for a couple of years, he went back to 
his law school in Beirut and started translating the Digest. He translated not just the books 
of the Digest dealt with by the law professors in accordance with Justinian's new curriculum, 
but the entire Digest.21 His translation must have had a wider aim than just providing 
students with the Greek of texts they needed to know. So he does not digress like other law 
professors, but merely translated. But as translating is also interpreting, he is not able to shy 
 
 
                                                          
 
18  Cf. e,g. Chr. Schnabel, Der solutionis causa adiectus im römischen Recht, (Münchener Beiträge zur 
Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte, Heft 110), München 2015. 
19  See Harke, Actio utilis (supra n. 9), esp. p. 293. See also Wesenberg, Verträge zugunsten Dritter (supra 
n. 9); R. Sotty, Recherche sur les utiles actiones. La notion d’action utile en droit romain classique, Gre-
noble 1977, pp. 425ff., and e.g. J. Schmidt-Ott, Pauli Quaestiones. Eigenart und Textgeschichte einer 
spätklassischen Juristenschrift, (Freiburger Rechtsgeschichtliche Abhandlungen. N. F., 18), Berlin 1993, 
pp. 182ff., with references. On the other hand, Finkenauer, Vererblichkeit und Drittwirkungen (supra n. 
9), p. 16, n. 15, states in general: ‘Die geäußerten Verdächtigungen haben alle zur Voraussetzung, daß die 
römischen Juristen sich an ihre Rechtsregel alteri stipulari nemo potest sklavisch gehalten hätten; genau 
dies ist aber sehr unwahrscheinlich’. With regard to C. 5,14,7, however, it should be stressed the 
interpolation is proven by Thalelaeus’ remark. 
20  Cf. J.F. Stagl, Favor dotis. Die Privilegierung der Mitgift im System des römischen Rechts, (Forschun-
gen zum Römischen Recht, Abhandlung 53), Wien 2009, pp. 146ff., esp. 151ff. 






away from inserting some clarifications or additions now and again, be it they are small in 
number and not very extensive in scope.22 
The rendering of the actio utilis in the last part of the above fragment has been under 
suspicion of being an interpolation since at least the days of Antoine Favre, Faber, who 
wrote his works around about 1600. The discussion was mainly about the content of the 
fragment, which seemed to be in contradiction with the general provision mentioned above 
and therefore could not stem from Paul. 
The traditional line of thought is: the Byzantines made a mess of it. But the so-called 
Byzantines were no fools. They knew their Homer and they knew their Paul.23 So why would 
they have made a fine text of Paul into an unappealing one? Would not the text of Paul 
without the granting of the actio utilis be a kind of superfluous statement of already known 
and long established principles? Hardly worth mentioning? Would he not have been stating 
the obvious? I believe in the authenticity of Paul's text. The constitution, on the other hand, 
hardly deserves the praise of a reasoned decision: it is a text smacking of mechanical 
changes. 
As I already said above, a more solid foundation for a suspected interpolation is what 
tends to be required nowadays: some clue to be found elsewhere in Justinian’s codification 
that leads us to suspect an interpolation. I believe a clue to the contrary can be found thanks 
to Dorotheus’ translation. At the end of his translation of this Digest fragment, he adds 
something remarkable. Let us take a look, once again, at the last sentence of the Digest 
fragment. It reads: favore enim nuptiarum et maxime propter affectionem personarum ad 
hoc decurrendum est, recourse to this should be had because of the favour conceded to 
marriage, and especially because of the affection existing between the parties. Ad hoc will 
 
 
                                                          
 
22  Cf. on Dorotheus, F. Brandsma, Dorotheus and his Digest translation, Groningen 1996. See also Van 
Bochove, Basilica Online Bibliography (supra n. 2), Nos. 426-433. 
23  Cf. e.g. H.L.W. Nelson, Überlieferung, Aufbau und Stil von Gai Institutiones, (Studia Gaiana. Vol. VI), 
Leiden 1981, pp. 206 ff., on the stylistic improvements upon Gaius’ Institutes made by the lawyers 
working on Justinian’s Institutes: ‘Sie haben sich grössere Mühe gegeben, ein grammatisch einwand-
freies Latein zu schreiben als Gaius selbst dies getan hatte.’ (p. 210); ‘Der justinianische sprachliche 
Ausdruck ist vielerorts “klassischer” als der gajanische.’ (p. 211); ‘Die Sprache der justinianischen 
Rechtslehrer weist mit der von Gaius, Paulus und Ulpian und anderen klassischen Autoren eine ver-
blüffende Ähnlichkeit auf und es ist den kaiserlichen Redaktoren gelungen, in sprachlicher und stilis-
tischer Hinsicht ein Intervall von mehr als drei Jahrhunderten zu überspringen.’ (p. 211). The same 
goes for the stylistic improvements in Digest fragments taken from Gaius: ‘Das günstige Urteil, das 
wir inbetreff der Institutionen aussprechen konnten, trifft auch zu auf die Digesten.’ (p. 259); ‘Das 
Latein der justinianischen Gaiusfragmente hat des öfteren ein “klassischeres” Gepräge als das des 
gajanischen Originals.’ (p. 260); ‘Die von Interpolationenforschern vertretene These, dass die 
justinianischen Digestenfragmente durch häufige Spätlatinismen, ja sogar “Byzantinismen” verunstal-
tet seien, muss denn auch, da sie im Widerspruch mit den Tatsachen stehen, zurückgewiesen werden.’ 
(p. 260). These claims are based on scant evidence given by Nelson. 
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refer here to the device, the mechanism, if you will, of giving an actio utilis. Now what does 
Dorotheus make of this? He wrote: 
 
BS 1927/26 (sch. F, Pa 1 ad B. 28,8,43 = D. 24,3,45) 
(…), εἰς τοῦτον κατατρέχομεν τὸν νόμον. 
‘(…), to this law we have recourse’. 
 
The question, of course, is: what law does he mean? Now once again I would like to stress 
Dorotheus was a member of both the committee that drew up the Digest, and the committee 
responsible for the second Code. When changes were made in the texts of both codes by 
these committees, he is the one who should know. When he is talking here about a law that 
made this change possible, he could have been referring to some constitution. He does not 
use, however, the word διάταξις. Moreover he speaks about this law (τοῦτον τὸν νόμον), 
the most obvious meaning of which would be the Digest fragment itself.24 
One should also be aware of a subtle change that had taken place once the text written 
by Paul had been adopted into the Digest. First, it is no longer an opinion by Paul, but it 
now is part of a constitution by Justinian, for which the word lex is in place. Second, the 
granting of an actio utilis is no longer an independent remedy, to be granted whenever a 
lawyer finds reason to do so. The only source of law after Justinian’s Digest is the imperial 
legislation, the leges, so it could well be a Justinianic law professor and a co-codificator at 
that, who tried to subtly bring this change to mind by replacing the talk of a remedy by a 
reference to ‘this law’. 
Now, I wonder whether Dorotheus would not have referred to the constitution, if that 
had been the ultimate source of the actio utilis in this case. Could it perhaps be the other 
way around? Is it possible the change in C. 5,14,7 was caused by D. 24,3,45? We would 
then have to surmise Paul’s text to be genuine and the constitution of Diocletian and 
Maximian to have been in contradiction with it. The original constitution might then have 
been in the first Code in its original form, denying an action. While working on the Digest 
Paul’s solution was found and preferred above the one given by Diocletian and Maximian. 
 
 
                                                          
 
24  Cf. on the use of διάταξις for constitution H.J. Scheltema, ‘Subseciva. III. Die Verweisungen bei den 
frühbyzantinischen Rechtsgelehrten’, TRG 30 (1962), pp. 355-357 (= Scheltema, Opera minora (supra 






Simon, in discussing Thalelaeus’ remark, said he could in this instance, unlike in other ones, 
not make out whether the change Thalelaeus discussed was made in the second Code.25 If 
my reasoning is correct, we could now put this case in file with the other cases of changes 
made in the second Code.26 An additional argument could be drawn from the use of the word 
σήμερον, to-day, in BS 2135/1, which seems to point to the most recent point in time the 
change could have been made. Of course, other reasons can be found why C. 5,14,7 was 
interpolated and not D. 24,3,45. The two instances of an actio utilis given could be quite 
unrelated. At least the Byzantines of Justinian’s day saw the relation between the two texts, 
witness an interlinear scholion of sixth-century origin: 
 
BS 1928/9 (sch. F, Pa 6§ ad B. 28,8,43 = D. 24,3,45) 
Ἀνάγνωθι βιβ. ε´ τοῦ Κωδ. τιτ. ιδ´. διατ. ζ´. 
‘Read book five of the Code, title fourteen, constitution seven’. 
 
This is one of the interlinear scholia, which sometimes occur in the manuscripts of the 
Basilica. They are written between the lines of the main text of the Basilica. Their age 
depends upon the way they are phrased. The date of the present scholion is indicated by the 
use of the word διάταξις and the reference to the Code. New scholia, scholia written after 
the Basilica were compiled, refer to the Basilica themselves and not to the original 
Justinianic codes.27 The above scholion must therefore be an old scholion from Justinian’s 
day. So at least according to the lawyers of the Justinianic age there was some connection 
between these two texts, the Digest text on the one hand and the constitution from the Code 
of 529 on the other hand. I suggest this connection is as follows. The constitution as found 
in the first Code was still the original one. It denied the right of action to the grandchildren. 
Then, while work on the Digest progressed the solution Paul gave was found.28 It appealed 
to the drafters and they decided, or better still, had Justinian decide, to change the text of 
 
 
                                                          
 
25  Cf. Simon, ‘Kodexunterricht des Thalelaios. C: Interpolationsberichte’ (supra n. 7), p. 302f. 
26  See on these changes in general e.g. S. Corcoran, ‘Justinian and His Two Codes: Revisiting P. Oxy. 1814’, 
JJP XXXVIII (2008), pp. 73-111, esp. p. 81 ff. about the arguments taken from the works of the sixth-
century antecessores. Cf. on the Code in general S. Corcoran, ‘The Codex of Justinian: The Life of a Text 
through 1,500 Years’, in Frier, The Codex of Justinian, Vol. I (supra n. 8), pp. xcvii-clxiv, and the 
‘Bibliography’, pp. clxv-clxxxi. 
27  See again Van Bochove, Basilica Online Bibliography (supra n. 2), Nos. 10-16. 
28  Cf. for the work on the Digest e.g. T. Honoré, Justinian’s Digest. Character and Compilation, Oxford 
2010. 
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the constitution in the second Code of 534. The actio utilis was granted to the grandchildren 
and equity was given as an explanation in a somewhat perfunctory way. Dorotheus knew 
about the change to come, perhaps even suggested it. He stressed the actio utilis was given 
by the Digest fragment, the lex, taken from Paul’s books of Questions. Dorotheus, too, was 
a member of the committee that drew up the second Code. To be more precise: he was the 
only law professor of that committee and together with Tribonian one of the steady forces 
behind the codification activities of Justinian. Remember he had also been a member of the 
committee that drew up the Institutes. Thalelaeus was a colleague of Dorotheus from the 
Beirut law-school who started teaching the Code and writing his commentary upon the 
Code, while Dorotheus wrote his translation of the Digest. 
The above case may well have been one of the instances, which all together gave the 
committee the idea to start work on a revised edition of the Code. 
Therefore, I take it the Digest text here led to the interpolation in the second Code. In 
this particular case it concerned an interpolation intended to return the law to the more 
classical opinion of Paul. Could Thalelaeus really call this a καινοτομία, a change in the 
law? Yes, I think he could. If the actio utilis did not occur in the first Code, but was adopted 
into the Digest by incorporating Paul’s opinion, then that opinion amounted to a change in 
the law, because Paul’s opinion only became law in a technical sense at the moment the 
Digest was promulgated in December 533. That is also, why Dorotheus can qualify Paul’s 
opinion as ‘this law’(τοῠτον τὸν νόμον) in the sense of lex. Therefore, in my opinion, it is 
not a change of the classical law, but a return to it. 
That leaves unanswered the question whether it is plausible Diocletian and Maximian 
could have given their rescript in contradiction of a respected lawyer's opinion. Of course it 
is. They must have known his opinion. And his opinion, no doubt, was one of many. But it 
was their duty and they had authority to settle the matter. That could explain why what looks 
like a simple enough question was even a matter for the emperors to decide in a rescript. 
Perhaps they also concluded their case was quite a different one from the one Paul dealt 
with. The former is about grandchildren and the latter about a granddaughter. Only the 
daughter has a special claim to a dowry, of course. In the end, the choice could have gone 
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